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We analyze cross-country panel data to examine the effect of key institutional features of 
social security systems on male labor supply. Our findings indicate that the labor supply 
of older males covaries negatively with replacement rates and system coverage, with the 
replacement rate effects being stronger for pay-as-you-go systems than for fully funded 
systems. The results also reveal a surprisingly small and often negative response of the 






  11. Introduction 
 
Longer life spans and aging populations are putting pressure on the retirement systems of 
many countries. The compression of morbidity observed in recent years produces 
healthier older people. This, in theory implies longer working lives. However, male old-
age labor force participation has fallen rapidly over the last decades. As shown in Figure 
1 below, the decline in old-age male labor force participation between 1970 and 2000 
appears to be reasonably consistent across countries and particularly pronounced in the 
developed world. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage Point Change in Labor Force Participation Rate of Males 
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  In this paper, we use new data on social security systems from 51 countries 
representing a range of income groups to estimate the degree to which social security 
systems can explain the declines in male labor force participation. Under standard social 
security systems, individuals receive an income stream that is apportioned throughout the 
retirement years. If these systems are actuarially fair, expected benefits over different 
  2retirement periods would perfectly match contributions and thus not have any direct 
influence on old-age labor market decisions (Stock and Wise, 1990; Cremer, Lozachmeur 
and Pestieau, 2006). However, actuarial fairness is not a feature of most pension systems, 
and retirement incentives are often quite pronounced (Gruber and Wise, 2004). When 
there is little to no financial incentive to continue working beyond the minimum 
retirement age, only those with strong preferences for working continue to do so (Blondal 
and Scarpetta, 1999).   
 
To better understand the magnitude of the labor force participation effects of 
social security systems, we separately estimate male labor supply equations for each five-
year cohort in a five-year panel. To control for year- and country-specific factors, we 
allow for both country and time-fixed effects in our specifications. We find that life 
expectancy and social security arrangements have little effect on labor supply below age 
55. For the 55–59 and 60–64 age groups we find that higher wages lead to earlier 
retirement, indicating that the income effect dominates. Our results show a surprisingly 
small and often negative response of old-age male labor force participation to 
improvements in life expectancy.  On the other hand, social security systems strongly 
affect old-age labor supply; high replacement rates under pay-as-you-go systems 
significantly lower old age male labor force participation.  
 
Our results are consistent with a set of recent country studies, many of which are 
summarized in two recent volumes by Gruber and Wise (1999; 2004). Our results imply 
that the negative effect of social security systems extends to an even broader set of 
countries than those focused on in the Gruber and Wise volumes. This is an important 
finding, because social security systems have been growing rapidly both in size and in 
their diffusion across the developing world and are likely to become a key factor in 
economic development. 
 
Our analysis follows most of the existing literature in assuming social security 
systems to be independent from labor supply trends. As pointed out by Gruber and Wise 
(1998), this assumption may be problematic if governments use social security schemes 
  3to accommodate public demand for social assistance for an aging population struggling in 
the labor market. For the purpose of our analysis this is only a minor issue. We give two 
reasons: first, individual country studies (e.g. Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1998) have 
shown that changes in policy generally precede changes in labor supply; second, and 
more importantly, in contrast to the aggregate ILO measures used in most previous 
studies, our social security measures describe old-age retirement systems only and thus 
exclude the early retirement schemes commonly used as broad substitute for old-age 
unemployment insurance. 
 
The results presented in this paper complement a more general literature on the 
effects of social security systems on economic growth. Social security systems distort 
savings incentives (Zhang and Zhang, 2004; Bloom, Canning, Mansfield and Moore, 
2007), fertility decisions (Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau, 2006), labor supply (Burtless 
and Moffitt, 1985; Krueger and Pischke, 1992; Coile and Gruber, 2000; Coile and 
Gruber, 2000), and economic growth (Zhang and Zhang, 2004; Ehrlich and Kim, 2005). 
In this paper we show that the effect of social security arrangements on male labor supply 
is significant and is therefore an important factor in understanding the long-term 
relationship between social security and economic development. For the most part, this 
paper does not address female labor supply, which follows different patterns than male 
labor supply. As shown in Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay (2007), decreases in fertility 
rates combined with general social trends have led to significant increases in female 
workforce participation over the last decades. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we discuss the data in section two of 
the paper and present the empirical results in section three. We conclude with a short 
summary and discussion of our main results. 
 
2. Data  
 
The dataset we use in our empirical work is an unbalanced five-year panel 
covering the period from 1970 to 2000 for 51 countries
2 that range from low to high 
                                                 
2 For a full list of countries, please see the Appendix. 
  4income. The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the male labor force 
participation rate. Labor market participation data are from the ILO Bureau of Statistics 
(2007) and are based on national labor market surveys and censuses. The participation 
rate is the number of economically active individuals divided by the total population in a 
given age group. Although definitions vary slightly across countries, those persons 
classified as “economically active” are either employed or actively looking for work (ILO 
Bureau of Statistics, 2007). Participation rates are provided for each five-year age group 
from age group 15–19 up to age group 60–64, and as an average for the population over 
age 64.  
 
Our explanatory variables are life expectancy, the percentage of the population 
living in urban areas, physical capital per working-age person, lagged economic growth, 
average years of schooling, and, of most interest for the purposes of this study, four 
variables describing the institutional settings of domestic social security systems.  
 
Life expectancy and urbanization data are from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2006). The physical capital stock is imputed based on the real 
capital investment rates from the Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 
2006), which is also the source for the lagged growth in real GDP per capita. To avoid 
potential simultaneity biases in the estimation, we adjust the capital stock by the working-
age population rather than the number of workers. Our human capital measures are the 
average years of schooling in the male and female population aged 25 and older as 
calculated by Barro and Lee (2000).   
 
Data on social security systems were compiled based on the Social Security 
Administration’s “Social Security Programs Throughout the World.”
3  The data 
originated from a survey conducted by the Social Security Administration that 
summarized the key features of national social security systems. We generate four 
variables based on each individual country report.  
 
                                                 
3 http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/ 
  5The first variable is a basic indicator that takes on a value of one if the system 
provides universal coverage. A system is assessed as “universal” if all employees are 
covered under the system. The variable is also coded to one if workers in a specific sector 
(e.g., agriculture or the public sector) are not covered by the general social security 
system, but receive similar coverage through related schemes.  
 
Our second main variable is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if 
the system provides retirement incentives. As discussed extensively in Gruber and Wise 
(1999; 2004), retirement incentives come in many forms that generally translate into very 
high net effective tax rates on income earned once the worker passes some set retirement 
age. Typically, pension payments will only start once the contributor retires, or only be 
(fully) paid if earnings do not exceed some given threshold. The U.S. system prior to 
2001 provides an example of this system: an earning test used to reduce pension receipts 
up until age 70. In 2001 the law was changed and now the test only applies for early 
retirement, between ages 62 and 65. We code our variable to one if the social security 
system provides explicit incentives to retire and to zero in all other cases, independent of 
the actuarial fairness of the system.  
 
In addition to these two broad indicator variables we calculate average 
replacement rates as a measure of the size or generosity of social security systems. The 
replacement rate is given by the size of the annual pension an average worker receives 
upon retirement relative to the typical pre-retirement income.
4 Distinguishing between 
the two broad types of pension systems, we calculate separate replacement rates for pay-
as-you-go and fully funded systems. In pay-as-you-go systems, the government uses 
contributions of current workers to pay the pensions of current retirees following some 
intergenerational contract. In a fully funded system, contributions are invested in the 
capital market and the earned income is used later to pay pensions. Although funded 
pensions are common in defined contribution programs and pay-as-you-go systems are 
often associated with defined benefit programs, these pairings do not always hold. 
                                                 
4 In our calculations we assume that workers enter the labor force at age 16 and that the average earnings 
correspond to two-thirds of GDP per worker.   
  6Defined contributions are sometimes part of pay-as-you-go systems, and some defined-
benefit schemes are at least partially based on capital accounts. We assess a system as 
funded if social security assets are held by either an independent fund or private 
companies that invest freely in a portfolio of assets. Systems like the Sri Lankan one, 
where the social security fund holds only debt, essentially mimic basic pay-as-you-go 
systems and are coded as such.  
 
In many cases ─ for example, the United States ─ pension systems are 
redistributive, so that replacement rates vary considerably across income groups. We 
normalize our measure to the average worker so as to have some comparable measure 
across countries. For fully funded systems we assume that the contributions in the fund 
earn a real rate of return of 3% a year, and are paid out as a constant real annuity upon 
retirement. This implies that for the average worker a 1% contribution over the working 
life should generate a pension corresponding to 5.7% of income.  
 
The coding is particularly difficult for countries (such as Colombia and Peru 
during the 1990s) that introduced new pension schemes over time and left the choice 
between the two systems to the worker. To promote comparability, we assume that all 
workers eventually fall under the new system, and calculate our measures accordingly. 
For countries that have multi-pillar systems with both a funded and a pay-as-you-go 
component (such as Australia, Denmark, and Switzerland) we calculate both replacement 
rates. 
 
We report descriptive statistics on the dataset we use in Table 1 below. The 
countries in the sample are drawn from each of the six major continents and cover a wide 
development spectrum. Income per capita (PPP) ranges from US$ 669 (Mali 1970) to 
US$ 34,364 (US 2000). Similar differences characterize educational attainment and life 
expectancy. For example, male life expectancy at birth ranges in 2000 between 38.1 years 
in Zambia and 77.4 years in Sweden. 
 
  7Male labor force participation rates in the age group 55–59 are generally around 
90% in developing countries and in the 70–80% range in industrialized countries. In 
2000, Belgium had the lowest participation rate (53.8%) in this age group, followed 
closely by Italy (53.9%) and Turkey (58.4%). Participation rates are significantly lower 
in the 60–64 age group, with a sample mean of 66.1%. A number of countries, such as 
Austria, Belgium, and France, display participation rates below 20% in 2000.   
 
Roughly three quarters of the social security systems we considered are classified 
as universal, and 57% are classified as providing retirement incentives. Average 
replacement rates in our sample are 13% and 52% for fully funded and pay-as-you go 
systems, respectively. Singapore is the big outlier within the fully funded systems. Due to 
total (employer plus employee) contribution rates exceeding 50% in the 1970s, pensions 
up to 285% of wages were paid in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 2000, replacement 
rates had dropped to a more moderate, but still quite impressive 135%. All other 
countries have average replacement rates below 100% over the sample period.
5  
 
                                                 
5 There are three cases where replacement rates temporarily exceed 100%: India and Malaysia in 2000 and 
New Zealand in 1975.  
  8Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
Ave. 10-year Annual Economic Growth (%)  314 2.19 1.93  -4.17  8.94
Average Years of Schooling, males age >25  314 6.53 2.53  0.36  12.45
Average Years of Schooling, females age >25 314 5.64 2.81  0.10  12.21
Capital per Worker  314 36.36 32.05  0.36  137.89
GDP per capita  314 10,515 8,063  681  34,365
Male Labor Force Participation Age 25-29  314 93.75 3.77  74.40  99.00
Male Labor Force Participation Age 30-34  314 96.34 2.53  81.00  99.40
Male Labor Force Participation Age 35-39  314 96.69 2.22  84.40  99.20
Male Labor Force Participation Age 40-44  314 96.43 1.95  86.10  99.58
Male Labor Force Participation Age 45-49  314 95.10 2.57  82.60  98.96
Male Labor Force Participation Age 50-54  314 91.51 4.41  69.00  98.75
Male Labor Force Participation Age 55-59  314 83.15 9.50  50.20  98.00
Male Labor Force Participation Age 60-64  314 65.92 18.51  14.10  93.53
Male Labor Force Participation Age 65+  314 36.72 23.19  1.90  81.45
Male Life Expectancy  314 65.41 8.67  38.10  77.38
Retirement Incentive  314 0.57 0.50  0  1
Replacement Rate Fully Funded  314 0.13 0.35  0.00  2.86
Replacement Rate pay-as-you-go  314 0.52 0.33  0.00  1.23
Universal System  314 0.75 0.43  0  1




3. Empirical Specification and Results 
 
To analyze the effect of social security on male labor force participation we 
estimate the parameters of the following reduced-form equation  
 
01 2 3 4 5 6 ijt it it it it it j t ijt LFP k Educ LE y Urban SocSec β ββ β ββ β δ δ ε =+ + + + + + ++ + &  
 
where LFPijt is the male Labor Force Participation rate of age group i in country j in 
period t, k is log capital per working age person, and Educ is a vector describing the 
educational attainment distribution. LE stands for life expectancy, Urban measures the 
degree of urbanization, and SocSec are the social security variables discussed in the 
previous section. δj and δt are country and year dummies, respectively.  
 
  9We use capital per working age person (kit) and education as our proxies for 
domestic wage rates or potential earnings. To limit endogeneity concerns we normalize 
the capital stock to the population of working age rather than the actual number of 
workers. For education, we use both the mean and the variance of educational attainment 
in our empirical specifications to capture the full educational distribution, and allow for 
different coefficients on male and female education. For a given average years of 
education, a higher variance of attainment implies a more uneven distribution of 
educational benefits, and thus a smaller fraction of the population profiting from higher 
wages. With income and substitution effects working in opposite directions the priors on 
the wage proxies are ambiguous. A negative coefficient on the average levels implies that 
the income effect dominates the substitution effect. A similar, yet slightly more subtle, 
argument applies to life expectancy. Although lifetime utility maximization generally 
implies a positive effect of life expectancy on retirement age (Bloom, Canning et al., 
2007), this may not necessarily be true if longer life spans are associated with lower 
degrees of uncertainty regarding the actual length of life (Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil, 
2005).  
 
To capture recent trends in the economy, we also include the average annual 
economic growth rate over the ten years preceding each observation. Higher economic 
growth implies a larger set of labor market opportunities and thus increases old-age labor 
market participation rates.  
 
Last, we estimate the effect of our three principal retirement variables: the 
retirement incentive indicator and the replacement rates in fully funded and pay-as-you-
go pension systems, respectively. Because fully funded systems essentially replace 
private savings, and because the link between actual contributions and benefits is often 
weak in pay-as-you-go systems, the latter system should lead to greater distortions 
keeping everything else constant. 
 
As shown in our presentation of the results, we have particular interest in the three 
age groups over 55, i.e., those who are eligible for retirement benefits. In Table 2 we 
  10show the results with time dummies only and time dummies with country fixed effects 
for the 55–59, 60–64, and 65+ age groups. Even with country fixed effects, higher 
replacement rates of the pay-as-you-go system result in lower male labor force 
participation among 55–59 year olds and also among 60–64 year olds. By contrast, for 
labor force participation decisions of men older than 65, the replacement rate of the pay-
as-you-go system is not significant when controlling for fixed effects. The results for the 
60–64 age group imply that an increase in the pay-as-you-go replacement rate from zero 
to full (100%) coverage reduces labor force participation by 4.7 percentage points. The 
effects are of a similar magnitude for the 55–59 age group, where the change in policy 
from zero to full coverage decreases participation by 5.7 percentage points. The fully 
funded system has no significant effect on male labor force participation for the 55–59 
and 60–64 year olds, while it has a positive and significant effect for the 65+ age group. 
If not already retired at 65, under a fully funded system some individuals continue to 
work to boost the contributions to their own retirement fund. Retirement incentives 
discourage work for the 55–59 year olds – the age group that is eligible for early 
retirement in many countries – while it is insignificant for the 60–64 age group. The 
insignificance of the retirement incentive for the 65+ age group is unsurprising, as the 
number of people working in this age group is small and the retirement decision at this 
age is mostly independent of retirement incentives. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Physical capital per working age person has a negative and significant coefficient 
under the fixed effects specifications for the 55–59 and 60–64 year olds as an indication 
of the dominant income effect in the labor supply decision. Taking the coefficient in 
column 4 we find that a 100% increase in the capital stock will decrease the extent of 
male labor force participation by 8.5 percentage points. Comparing the life expectancy 
effect on the three age groups under the fixed effects specifications (columns 2, 4, and 6), 
the signs and significance vary. For the 55–59 age group, increasing life expectancy by 5 
years raises labor force participation by 0.94 percentage points. This either reflects better 
health of the workers and thus lower demand for early retirement through disability, or 
  11that males in this age group continue to work to maintain a constant consumption stream 
over an extended number of years. Turning to column 4, life expectancy does not have a 
significant effect on male labor force participation of the 60–64 year olds once we control 
for country fixed effects. By contrast, for the 65+ age group, shown in columns 5 and 6, 
increasing life expectancy by 5 years will lower labor force participation of this age 
group by 2.83 percentage points once we control for country fixed effects.  
 
The ten-year annual economic growth coefficients show a reversal of sign when 
country fixed effects are introduced into the specification. For the 55–59 age group, a 
country with economic growth 1 percentage point higher than another country will have a 
0.5 percentage point higher male labor force participation. A similar order of magnitude 
is seen for the 60-64 year olds, with a 1 percentage point increase in economic growth 
leading to an increase in male labor force participation of this age group of 0.6 percentage 
points. By contrast, under the fixed effects specification for the 65+ age group, the 
economic growth has no significant effect. The coefficient on urbanization also 
experiences a reversal of the sign when fixed effects are introduced into the specification. 
While the effect of urbanization appears negative in the specifications without fixed 
effects, the fixed specification displayed in column 2 of Table 2 implies that a 10% 
higher urbanization rate is associated with a 1.3% higher male labor force participation in 
the age group 55-59. The magnitude is even higher for the 60–64 age group, where 
countries with 10% higher proportion of urban population will have a 5.2% higher male 
force participation rate.  
 
With the prior that more education tends to lead to a higher wage, the negative 
sign on the average male years of schooling indicates that the income effect dominates in 
the labor supply decision for the 60–64 year olds. A higher variance of the male years of 
schooling is associated with a higher male labor force participation rate; a mean 
preserving spread in the wage distribution decreases the number of workers profiting 
from high wages and thus increases labor force participation. On the other hand, female 
education has a positive effect on male labor force participation. Given the positive 
  12correlation between female education and female labor supply, this result may provide 
evidence of a joint, complementary, household decision about labor force participation.  
 
Table 3  here 
 
In Table 3 we examine the five-year age groups from the 25–29 through to the 
60–64 age group regression with fixed effects. Life expectancy has a significant and 
positive effect for the 50–59 year olds, while it has no significant effect on younger age 
groups. Retirement incentives have a positive effect on the 45–59 age groups: if men 
have the incentive to retire at 60 then this promotes participation up to that age. The 
replacement rate of the fully funded system has no significant effect on male labor force 
participation, while the pay-as-you-go has a negative effect from the 45–49 age group 
through to age group 60–64. We did not expect a negative effect the pay-as-you-go 
replacement rate on the 45–49 and 50–54 age groups, as retirement is extremely limited 
as an option for these people.  
 
4. Summary  
 
In this paper, we estimate the effect of key institutional features of national social 
security systems on male labor force participation. We find fully funded systems to be of 
little relevance in the old-age workforce participation decision, while pay-as-you-go 
systems significantly lower male participation above age 50. However, these effects are 
relatively small: our point estimates imply that the introduction of a pay-as-you-go 
system with full (100%) replacement will reduce old-age labor supply by around 5%. 
Given average declines in male participation of around 30% in most developed countries 
over the last decades and relatively modest changes in social security systems, the overall 
contribution of pension schemes to the recent trend is small. Overall, income effects, as 
measured by physical and human capital, seem to dominate the substitution effect ─ a 
finding consistent with the notch-generation study by Krueger and Pischke (1992). The 
relatively small effect of retirement incentives is also consistent with recent upward 
  13trends in female old-age labor supply, which exist in contrast to downward trends among 
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Table 2: Male Labor Force Participation Age Groups 55–59, 60–64 and 65 plus  
 
 
Dependent Variable  Male Labor Force Participation Rate 
  Age 55–59 Age  60–64  Age 65 and older 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Log Capital per Worker  -2.700***  -5.452*** -3.695**  -8.491***  -3.902***  0.277 
 (0.844)  (0.923)  (1.428)  (1.675)  (1.440)  (2.003) 
Male Life Expectancy  -0.303***  0.188**  -0.777***  0.069  -0.924***  -0.566*** 
 (0.096)  (0.090)  (0.161)  (0.145)  (0.245)  (0.182) 
10-Year Annual Econ. 
Growth  
-0.418 0.511***  -0.356  0.615**  -0.483  0.138 
 (0.265)  (0.166)  (0.472)  (0.243)  (0.504)  (0.299) 
Urbanization -0.093**  0.131*  -0.198***  0.517***  -0.295***  0.074 
 (0.039)  (0.072)  (0.066)  (0.132)  (0.051)  (0.119) 
Male Years of Education  -1.021  0.809 -3.576***  -2.758*  -1.264  -0.378 
Mean (0.639)  (0.804)  (1.165)  (1.432)  (1.136)  (1.363) 
Male Years of Education  0.445***  0.423**  0.063  0.889***  -0.641**  0.058 
Variance (0.165)  (0.176)  (0.313)  (0.325)  (0.317)  (0.311) 
Female Years of Education  1.991***  1.212  3.681***  4.044***  -0.579  -0.251 
Mean (0.693)  (0.870)  (1.204)  (1.457)  (1.181)  (1.353) 
Female Years of Education  -0.060  -0.431**  0.857***  -0.561  1.483***  -0.169 
Variance (0.142)  (0.184)  (0.262)  (0.355)  (0.249)  (0.363) 
Retirement Incentive  1.384  2.098***  1.121  -1.767  1.587  -1.642 
 (1.149)  (0.804)  (1.976)  (1.425)  (1.690)  (1.456) 
Replacement Rate FF  -0.007  0.890 2.685  0.280 5.020** 5.153** 
 (1.200)  (1.670)  (2.052)  (2.708)  (2.186)  (2.505) 
Replacement Rate PAYGO  -5.429***  -5.231*** -7.322***  -4.711*  -7.936*** -4.204 
 (1.471)  (1.423)  (2.389)  (2.445)  (2.412)  (2.750) 
Share 65–69 of Ages 65+         -3.186  32.825** 
         (28.428)  (15.570) 
Share 70–74 of Ages 65+         -59.478  20.328 
         (56.513)  (23.821) 
Constant 105.11***  73.52***  127.19***  55.59***  144.06***  82.69*** 
 (4.763)  (6.259)  (7.887)  (9.314)  (28.359)  (13.987) 
            
Time Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Country Fixed Effects  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
            
Observations 314  314  314  314  314  314 
R-squared 0.48  0.91  0.55  0.94  0.76  0.96 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Male Labor Force Participation All Age Groups: Year and Country Fixed Effects  
 
Dependent Variable:  Male Labor Force Participation Rate Age Group 
Age Group:  25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 
              
Log (Capital per Working Age)  -1.290**  -0.381  -0.543 -0.527 -0.739* -1.918***  -5.452***  -8.491*** 
  (0.548) (0.391) (0.350) (0.339)  (0.391)  (0.595)  (0.923)  (1.675) 
Male Life Expectancy  -0.049  0.049  0.025  -0.005  0.037  0.114**  0.188**  0.069 
  (0.055) (0.047) (0.044) (0.037)  (0.033)  (0.051)  (0.090)  (0.145) 
Economic Growth (Avg. last 10Y)  0.229**  0.177**  0.086  0.080*  0.100*  0.130  0.511***  0.615** 
  (0.095) (0.071) (0.066) (0.047)  (0.051)  (0.089)  (0.166)  (0.243) 
Urbanization 0.099**  -0.016  0.010  0.075***  0.034  0.037  0.131*  0.517*** 
  (0.049) (0.044) (0.032) (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.046)  (0.072)  (0.132) 
Mean Male Years of Education   0.760  0.553  0.415  -0.449**  -0.809***  0.270  0.809  -2.758* 
  (0.509) (0.478) (0.380) (0.212)  (0.250)  (0.445)  (0.804)  (1.432) 
Variance Male Years of Education  -0.093  -0.144  -0.129*  0.011  0.051  0.186**  0.423**  0.889*** 
  (0.110) (0.106) (0.077) (0.050)  (0.060)  (0.091)  (0.176)  (0.325) 
Mean Female Years of Education  -0.224  -0.321  -0.443  0.559**  1.066***  0.863*  1.212  4.044*** 
  (0.486) (0.439) (0.355) (0.217)  (0.272)  (0.496)  (0.870)  (1.457) 
Variance Female Years of Education  0.223  0.322**  0.368***  0.140***  0.090  -0.133  -0.431**  -0.561 
  (0.147) (0.148) (0.100) (0.053)  (0.064)  (0.096)  (0.184)  (0.355) 
Retirement Incentive  0.235  0.510  0.526*  0.206  0.816**  1.663***  2.098***  -1.767 
  (0.355) (0.309) (0.286) (0.287)  (0.363)  (0.537)  (0.804)  (1.425) 
Replacement Rate FF  0.680 0.178 0.549 0.304  0.455 1.071 0.890 0.280 
  (0.719) (0.411) (0.608) (0.532)  (0.565)  (0.986)  (1.670)  (2.708) 
Replacement Rate PAYGO  0.046 0.438 0.397 -0.359  -1.384**  -4.170*** -5.231*** -4.711* 
  (0.755) (0.498) (0.462) (0.437)  (0.600)  (0.963)  (1.423)  (2.445) 
Constant  80.79*** 89.64*** 90.97*** 92.26***  93.03*** 85.87*** 73.52***  55.59*** 
  (3.811) (2.987) (2.780) (2.196)  (2.322)  (3.785)  (6.259)  (9.314) 
              
Time  Fixed  Effects  YES YES YES YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Country  Fixed  Effects  YES YES YES YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
              
Observations  314 314 314 314  314  314  314  314 
R-squared  0.84 0.76 0.80 0.84  0.85  0.86  0.91  0.94 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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